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1. Introduction
The performance of microfinance institutions has been debated quite extensively in
the literature (for a recent survey, see Morduch 1999). This debate has focused on the
(unconventional) methods that microfinance institutions use to improve borrowers’
payback behaviour. The theoretical literature has especially dealt with the
implications of group lending practices with jointly liable borrowers (see e.g. Ghatak
and Guinnane, 1999).
1 A joint liability contract specifies that the entire group is
liable for loans that are given to individual group members. A well-known example is
the Grameen Bank's group lending program. It has been emphasised that group
lending with joint liability may lead to peer-monitoring or peer-pressure among
group members which reduces problems of moral hazard and enforcement (Stiglitz,
1990 and Besley and Coate, 1995). A reason is that a high joint liability component in
the debt contract provides incentives to borrowers to choose a safe investment project.
A recent group of theoretical papers has emphasised that joint liability
induces group members to self-select each other (e.g. Ghatak, 2000). These papers
argue that the optimal outcome is one in which all borrowers with the same
probability of success match together (homogeneous matching). It has also been
argued that the optimality of homogeneous matching only holds in a frictionless
world (Sadoulet and Carpenter, 2001 and references therein). However, the real world
is characterised by frictions due to e.g. imperfect information, the unavailability of
partners with the same risk characteristics, the inability to enforce contracts and the
inability to fully screen and monitor group members. The advocates of the matching
frictions theory argue that heterogeneous matching might take place, but that the
heterogeneity is entirely due to so-called “matching frictions. ” In other words, the
matching frictions theory suggests that there will be homogeneous matching in the
case where the analysis controls for matching frictions. In other words, when there are
matching frictions leading to some heterogeneity, the matching is still “essentially
homogeneous”; heterogeneity is simply due to frictions and therefore generates
deviations from optimality. Yet, empirical evidence on the homogeneous matching
hypothesis in general and the matching frictions theory in particular is lacking. One of3
the few exceptions is Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) for microcredit groups in
Guatemala.
This paper takes up the challenge by aiming to examine the empirical
relevance of the homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea.
We conducted a survey (personal interviews) in 2001 among members and group
leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from two microcredit programmes in
Eritrea.
2 The survey includes questions related to the group formation process, and
provides information that can be used to test the matching frictions hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some information on
microcredit groups in Eritrea. Section 3 surveys the group formation and
homogeneous matching literature that is most closely related to our paper. In Section
4 we explain the methodology we use to test the matching frictions hypothesis. In
Section 5 we explain how we measure risk, a variable that we need to test for
homogeneous matching. Section 6 presents two groups of independent variables that
are assumed to affect risk behavior. In this section we also apply factor analysis to
regroup these variables in a smaller number of factors. In Section 7, we estimate risk
behavior. The results of this equation are used in Section 8 to test whether
homogeneous matching holds if matching frictions are accounted for. Finally, Section
9 concludes.
2 Organisational profile of the group lending programs in Eritrea.
In Eritrea there are two microfinance institutions. The first is the Saving and Credit
Programme (SCP), which operates as a component of the Eritrean community
development fund (ECDF) since July 1996. The other is the Southern Zone Saving
and Credit Scheme (SZSCS) that has been launched bythe Agency for Co-operation
and Research in Development (ACORD) in 1994.
The saving and credit program ECDF/SCP
The government of Eritrea, the World Bank (IDA) and loans and grants from donors
are the main sources of funds for ECDF/SCP. The aim of the SCP is to provide
financial services to the vulnerable group in the rural and urban areas who have no4
access to formal banking services. Grassroots-based solidarity groups owning and
operating “Village Banks” will form the backbone of the program.
While its immediate objective is to provide access to credit and saving to
people who are outside the orbit of the formal banking network, its long term
objective is to strengthen its institutional setting and together with SZSCS, establish
the legal, regulatory and judicial framework for the microfinance sector of Eritrea.
The SCP is principally based on the creation of autonomously functioning
Village Banks, “VB,” typically serving 35-105 members. The village bank is
administered at the village level through a saving and credit unit made up of three
members. The village/ area administrator acts as a chairperson while the other two
from client members are responsible for accounts and record keeping. All loan
applications are processed in the village bank before they are forwarded to the
regional SCP credit officer for final decisions and payments. However, repeated loans
are processed during VB monthly meetings and loans are granted on the spot.
Borrowers are allowed to select loan maturity periods instead of requiring that all
borrowers comply with the fixed loan terms. Loans range from 1000 to 10000 Nakfas,
although individuals are allowed to withdraw less if they want to. Note that Nafka is
the name of the Eritrean Currency. The official exchange rate is US$ 1 = 14 Nakfas.
SCP charges a 16% interest rate, which is higher than what the commercial
banks in Eritrea charge.
Beneficiaries will be eligible for SCP credit if and only if they are members of a
solidarity group (SG). The solidarity group should consist of 3-7 members. The SG
has to be governed by the principles of joint liability and members should not belong
to the same family. Group members become eligible for loans only after having
successfully accumulated 10 % mandatory savings within a period of three months.
The Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme (SZSCS)
The main objective of the Scheme is to provide underprivileged people access to
credit. In addition it has the objective of strengthening the institutional capacity of the
scheme.5
The foundation of the scheme consists of 5-7 member credit and saving
groups (CSGs) who are established based on the joint liability principles. The credit
and saving groups elect five members to a Village Credit and Savings Committee
(CSC). Loan applications forwarded by borrowing groups are screened and approved
bythe CSC. Once approved by the CSC the credit officer will forward the loan after
further evaluation to the borrowing group in one of the monthly group meetings.
Saving is mandatory and groups have to save 5 % of the requested loan amount
before requesting a loan. Loans range between Nakfa 100 and 8000 and the maturity
period is determined based on a mutual understanding between the loan officer and
the borrower. The scheme charges an interest rate of 14 %.
3. Other literature on group formation and homogeneous matching
Most of the matching literature draws heavily from the work of Becker (1993), who
has worked extensively on marriage matching theory. Ghatak (1999) presents a
simple model why self-selection of groups will lead to homogeneous matching. Here
we explain the main insights.
The main reason why the theoretical literature argues that borrowers with
equal risk profiles will form groups is that the value of having a safe partner is
positive for all individuals and increasing in the own probability of success. This
implies that the gain for a risky borrower of joining a group with a safe borrower is
always lower than the loss for a safe borrower of forming a group with a risky
borrower. Hence, a risky borrower can not cross-subsidise a safe borrower in order to
be accepted as a partner, leading to groups containing partners of equal risk.
One of the most sophisticated theoretical models on the homogeneous
matching hypothesis is due to Ghatak (2000). He shows that if lenders are able to
offer a continuum of debt contracts, containing different values for the interest rate
and the joint liability component, incentive compatible separating equilibria may
result. The safe types prefer a combination of a high joint liability component and a
low lending rate, whereas the opposite will hold for a risky borrower. In this way, a
lender may obtain information on the type of the borrower.6
Xinhau Gu (2000) also deals with the formation of borrowing groups through
the exploitation of local information and joint liability. He states that static models
implicitly assume a borrower to always be endowed with acceptable (capable)
projects. However, entrepreneurs usually have difficulties finding investment
opportunities and dynamic search models are useful tools to address such problems.
He examines the impact of uncertainty about investment opportunities on borrowers’
project search decision and on the rate of loan repayment. He shows that safe
borrowers prefer to group with safe borrowers since the effective cost of borrowing is
positively related to risk taking by group members.
Laffont (2000) shows the role of group lending in differentiating between
borrowers of different types (adverse selection). He states that group-lending
contracts offer a subtle method of discrimination between borrowers. When
collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed for, group
lending as an instrument improves discrimination between entrepreneurs of different
types. So, similar types match together.
Sadoulet (1999) presents a model that challenges the commonly assumed
homogeneous matching hypothesis. In his model, group membership is endogenous
and group performance depends on both members’ types and on the distribution of
those types. According to Sadoulet, group members choose partners in a context of
missing insurance markets. The point he wants to make is that if insurance markets
are missing, then homogeneity is not optimal anymore. Heterogeneity emerges as a
constrained first best choice. Sadoulet suggests that members set up insurance
arrangements within their group in which partners will cover each other’s loans in
case of project failure. The reason for insurance is that borrowers live and work in
risky environments and hence need insurance. If a member, who is able to insure a
partner in need, refuses to pay for him, he will lose together with other member’s
access to future loans from the program because of the joint liability principle.
Alongside these insurance arrangements there exists transfer payments between
members when both members are successful to remunerate the safe one for covering
for the risky one in times of need. Thus, this insurance arrangement is taken to be an
important part of the group formation process. To this end, Sadoulet’s model7
suggests a non-monotonic matching pattern in which safer borrowers will always
form groups heterogeneously with partners riskier than themselves. Middle-type
borrowers match either heterogeneously with safer borrowers or homogeneously with
borrowers of their type depending on whether these are available. Finally, the riskier
borrowers match homogeneously. Note that the models by Ghatak (1999) and
Sadoulet (1999) are similar. Ghatak gets homogeneous matching since his model is
static, whereas Sadoulet gets heterogeneous matching since his model is repeated.
Moreover, in the model by Ghatak, the benefit of homogeneous matching is that it
improves repayment rates and thus leads to lower interest rates. The problem is that
the decrease in the interest rate can not compensate the safe borrowers for having to
cover the risky borrowers’ loans when they fail. So, safe and risky borrowers will not
form groups. In the model by Sadoulet the benefit is not lower interest rates, but
access to future loans, which has a much bigger direct value.
Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) state that, in urban economies with
heterogeneous, anonymous, and relatively mobile borrowers, random (rather than
assortative) matching is incentive compatible for all types of borrowers. A particular
feature of their paper is that they assume that borrowers do not know each other. They
show that cross-subsidisation among members provides a kind of a collateral that
reduces the negative externalities from risky to safe borrowers. The main implication
of their work is that, as we move away from village economies by allowing imperfect
information, assortative matching no longer leads to an equilibrium, and yet group
lending can improve efficiency and enhance welfare.
There are few empirical studies available that have rigorously tested the
homogeneous matching hypothesis. Most empirical studies have simply assumed that
homogeneous matching takes place. Some studies, however, provide some insights.
For instance, Van Tassel (2000), for groups belonging to BancoSol, Bolivia, found
that groups match heterogeneously in unobservable business characteristics.
The only empirical paper available that has rigorously tried to investigate the
matching of group members is the one by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001). For credit
groups in Guatemala they estimated the relationship between risk and the level of
risk heterogeneity in the individual groups, explicitly accounting for the endogeneity8
of group formation and of borrowers’ choice of project risk. Their results show that
borrowers in Guatamala group heterogeneously, and that the heterogeneity cannot be
explained by matching frictions. In line with the theoretical paper by Sadoulet
(1999), they suggest that borrowers might want to form heterogeneous groups in
order to set up insurance arrangements.
4. The methodology: The role of matching frictions
We follow the methodology set out by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001). The reader is
referred to their paper for a detailed explanation of the methodology. The main
problem we have to deal with is as follows. The matching frictions theory states that
homogeneous matching only holds in a frictionless world, and that all heterogeneity
comes from matching frictions. This implies that there should be no statistically
significant relationship between first best risk (risk in a frictionless world) and
heterogeneity. In order to test this theory, we need indicators for first-best risk and
matching frictions. The problem is that these variables are not observable. Sadoulet
and Carpenter (2001) solve this problem as follows. They start by arguing that with
matching frictions the full system of equations (the structural model) can be specified
as:
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The trick is to first estimate the actual risk equation, for which we take, for reasons of
convenience, a linear specification:
4) i i i i f X r ε β α + + = .
From this regression, estimated values for first-best risk and matching frictions can
be obtained:
5) α i i X r =
*
6) β β i i f f =
These estimated values are then substituted in the equation for heterogeneity:
7) i i i i f r h ε β δ γ α + + + =
*
Homogeneous matching will be empirically confirmed if 0 = γ . It is expected that
δ≥ 0.
5. How to measure risk?10
The first step in the analysis is to develop a measure for risk, which is needed to
estimate the risk equation (equation 4). Note that in the theoretical models it is
assumed that there is only one project available per individual, which implies that
projects and borrowers are interchangeable. This also implies that the theoretical
measure for risk refers to both the riskiness of the borrower and the project. However,
empirically there is no perfect measure for this theoretical risk concept available. We
proxy the theoretical concept of risk by developing a measure for the
risk of a borrower’s repayment strategy. Even this is not directly measurable, and
therefore has to be proxied by an (admittedly imperfect) indicator. In line with
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where Pi is the loan payment due per month (loan payments are once per month for
the credit programmes)
3 and Si is the amount the borrower reported having saved one
weak before the due date to cover the loan payments.
4 The risk indicator varies
between 0 and 1. The higher the percentage amount saved a week before the
repayment date, the lower is the risk of a borrower’s repayment strategy. It should be
noticed that a possible caveat of our risk measure is that a person who gets a fixed
payment (more than Pi) in the week before the payment can be very safe despite the
fact that Si=0. However, we don’t think that this will substantially affect our results
since this does not seem to happen often in practice. Table 1 gives information on the
risk measure, and the variables used to construct this measure. The table also provides
data on the credit amount. Figure 1 gives a kernel distribution of r.
<insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here>
The value of loans ranges from 750 Nakfas to 8500 Nakfas, with mean and median
loan size of 3961 and 3500 Nakfas. Loan terms vary between 3 months and 2411
months. Loans are used most of the time for working capital (information not in
table). The mean of our risk indicator is about 0.17, with an even lower median
(0.09). Of the 351 borrowers, 105 are left censored on the risk measure (r=0), 10 are
right censored ( r=1) and 236 are uncensored (0<r<1). Note that none of the variables
is normally distributed.
6. Variables proxying for first-best risk and matching frictions
The next step in the analysis is to determine which variables possibly affect risk,
which of those variables are related to first-best risk and which of them are related to
matching frictions. Hence, referring to equation 4 above, we need to determine a
vector of variables X (first best) and f (matching frictions).
Matching frictions (f)
Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) argue that variables proxying for matching frictions
include indicators of the degree of asymmetric information among different members
of a group, proxies for the ability to monitor and screen the activities of the different
members in a group, and variables on the available borrowing options. From our data
set we select the following list of variables related to monitoring, screening, the
available information about each other and the possibility to obtain credit.
1) BORN: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower is born in the village, zero
otherwise
2) KNOW: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knew the members well
before meeting them in the group, zero otherwise
3) INTEG: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knew about the behavioural
integrity of all current group members before the formation of the group, zero
otherwise
4) ACTIV: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knows what the (daily)
economic activities of the other group members are, zero otherwise
5) PURP: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knows for what purpose the
other group members acquired their last loans12
6) SEL: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower approximately knows the
weekly sales of the other group members, zero otherwise
7) NUMBER: the amount of members of the group
8) LDIST: the logarithm of the average distance of the business of the borrower from
that of the other group members
9) VISIT: a dummy variable with a one if the members visit each other regularly,
zero otherwise.
10) PROBLEM: a dummy with a one if the borrower has had problems in repaying
debt before, zero otherwise.
11) OTHER: a dummy with a one if the borrower has other sources of credit, zero
otherwise
12) ACORD: a dummy variable with a one if the group belongs to the SZSCS
(ACORD) system, 0 otherwise
13) CHANGE: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower has participated before in
another group, zero otherwise
From this list of variables, BORN, KNOW,INTEG, ACTIV, PURP and SEL primarily
refer to social ties and the amount of information members have about each other.
Some of these variables deal in particular with the available information before
forming the group (especially KNOW and INTEG, and to some extent BORN), others
refer to information after the group has been formed (ACTIV, PURP and SEL). An
increase in value of one of these indicators implies more information about each other
and probably stronger social ties. NUMBER, LDIST and VISIT have to do with the
(possibility of) monitoring and screening each other’s activities. More visits among
members, and a lower distance between members probably increase screening
possibilities. More group members tend to increase monitoring efforts, but there is
also more scope for free riding. PROBLEM and OTHER refer to possibilities to obtain
credit from other sources. OTHER directly measures whether a borrower has been
able to raise funds from other sources than the microfinance institution. PROBLEM
measures repayment problems in the past, and may give an indication of future
possibilities to raise credit. ACORD and CHANGE are not directly related to the13
issues mentioned so far, but, as will become clear later, they have been included since
they are highly correlated with one of the other indicators from this list.
First-best risk (X)
We assume that first-best risk can be picked up by variables that are directly related to
the socio-economic situation of the borrower. We consider the following variables:
14) LINC: the logarithm of total monthly income
15) AGE: the age of a borrower
16) GENDER: a dummy with a one for a male, and a zero for a woman
17) ILLIT: a dummy with a one if the borrower is illiterate, zero otherwise
18) PRIM: a dummy with a one if the borrower has primary education, zero otherwise
19) SEC: a dummy with a one if the borrower has secondary education, zero
otherwise
20) LEADER: a dummy with a one if the borrower is a group leader, zero otherwise
21) MUSLIM: a dummy with a one if the borrower is a Muslim, zero otherwise.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Table 2 provides information on the zero/ one dummies. The table shows that about
half of the borrowers still live in the village they were born. A substantial number of
the borrowers knew each other before forming the group. Also, most borrowers have
some knowledge about the activities of the other members of the group.
Nevertheless, there is only a small fraction of the total group of borrowers that knows
the approximately weekly sales of other borrowers. About 28 % of the borrowers
admitted to have had repayment problems. Only 18 borrowers reported that they have
other sources of credit, in addition to the micro credits. Moreover, almost nobody
ever applied for a bank credit (only 14 borrowers did). For six of them, the bank
refused a loan (the latter information is not given in the table). The total sample
consists of 351 borrowers, of which 167 are borrowers from SZSCS and 184 from
SCP. In Eritrea there are six zones. The data comes from four zones. In two zones14
Eritrea only recently started to set up microfinance groups. The SZSCS only operates
in the southern zone, the SCP all over the country.
The majority of the respondents are illiterate or with only reading and writing
abilities. Out of the total 32 % admitted that they are illiterate and 36 % have only
primary school education. Secondary graduates include only5 % of the data. About
20% of the respondents are Muslim, the rest are Christian. There are 155 women and
196 men in the data set.
Table 3 provides data on the remaining independent variables.
<insert Table 3 about here>
The table shows that the average borrower is 46 years old, with an average monthly
income (INC) of 1017 Nakfas. Trading is the main occupation of the majority of the
borrowers (63%), followed by farming (17%). The remainder is distributed between
services, daily labourers, and others. Often borrowers have different occupations at
the same time, for instance, food vending and a traditional restaurant. The borrowers
sell articles ranging from food items to clothing and provide services such as the
provision of hot meals, pubs, local beverages and teashops (latter information is not in
table). The number of members per group varies between 3 and 8, with an average of
4. In the median group, 60% is woman. The average distance between group
members’ business is about 500 meters.
Regrouping of the variables
The concepts matching frictions and first-best risk are latent variables, which are not
directly observable. Above, we have selected a group of variables that is assumed to
be related to matching frictions, and a group of variables that is assumed to be related
to first-best risk. In order to better account for the high collinearity between some of
the variables within the two groups, and in order to test whether we can reduce the
number of independent variables byconstructing a smaller amount of new composite
variables, we performed a multiple factor analysis (MFA).15
We started by applying a factor analysis on the indicators of the group of
variables related to matching frictions. The analysis suggests that 11 indicators in this
group can be decomposed into 3 underlying factors. The two remaining indicators
(PROBLEM and OTHER) are left out of this analysis since they have very low factor
loadings, even if more underlying factors are allowed for. The factor loadings of the
analysis are given in Table 4.
<insert Table 4 about here>
The first factor mainly has to do with KNOW and INTEG, suggesting that the
underlying factor in this case relates to information members have about each other
before they formed a group. ACORD and NUMBER mainly determine the second
factor. NUMBER has a negative factorloading, which suggests that, with respect to
our sample, the average amount of members in credit groups from the ACORD
(SCSZS) system is lower than that of the SCP microfinance system. A closer look at
the data set confirms this: the average number of members in credit groups from the
SCP is 5.2, whereas it equals 3.6 for the ACORD (SCSZS) system. The positive factor
loading on VISIT suggests that members of credit groups from the ACORD system
visit each other more regularly than those of the SCP system. The third factor mainly
h a st od ow i t hPURP and to a lower extent with ACTIV. This gives the impression
that in this case the underlying factor relates to information members have about each
other’s business, after the group has been formed.
In the remainder of the analysis we will use the three factors, instead of the
11 original indicators. We interpret FACTOR1 and FACTOR3 as factors that
primarily have to do with the asymmetry of information among group members.
FACTOR1 picks up information before forming the group, FACTOR3 picks up
information after the group has been formed. FACTOR2 primarily relates to being a
member of a credit group within the ACORD microfinance system. This factor might
be important for risk taking since it strongly correlates with the number of members
within a group. This gives information on a possible peer monitoring effort.
Armendariz de Aghion (1999, proposition 3, p.95) states “A larger group size tends to16
increase peer monitoring effort, due to a joint-responsibility, a cost-sharing, and a
commitment effect. However… a larger group size (also) increases the scope for free
riding in debt-repayment decisions”.
5
We also tried a factor analysis on the indicators for first-best risk. However,
here the factor analysis showed that it is not possible to combine the indicators into a
smaller group of underlying factors. The number of factors that has to be taken into
account to accept the null hypothesis of enough factors is almost equal to the original
amount of indicators. Therefore, we decided to proceed with the individual first-best
indicators in the remainder of the analysis.
7. Estimating risk
The next step in the analysis is to examine the possible empirical relevance of our
matching frictions and first-best risk variables for explaining risk of a borrower's
liquidity strategy. In other words, the next step is the estimation of equation (4).
The dependent variable is the proxy for risk, r, which we have constructed.
The independent variables are the 8 first-best risk indicators, the three factors related
to matching frictions, and the remaining two variables (PROBLEM and OTHER),
which are also related to matching frictions. To examine non-linear effects we also
tried quadratic terms, but, except for the quadratic term of LINC (LINC2),n o n eo f
them appeared to be significant, and hence were left out of the analysis.
The constructed dependent variable is censored between 0 and 1. Therefore,
we estimate with the TOBIT estimation technique with left and right censoring (using
NORMAL distribution of error terms). We also present ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates, to test for differences in outcome due to different estimation techniques.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5
<insert Table 5 about here>
Equations 1A and 1B show that LINC, LINC2, LEADER, SEC, PROBLEM and
FACTOR2 significantly affect risk behaviour. Since LINC has a significantly negative
coefficient and LINC2 a significantly positive coefficient, there seems to be a non-17
linear relationship between the income of a borrower and his risk behaviour. For low
income levels, an increase in income lowers risk, whereas it increases risk after a
certain threshold level of income has been passed. Positive significant coefficients for
LEADER, SEC and PROBLEM suggest that a group leader takes more risk than a
normal group member, that members who are more educated take more risk, and that
members who have had payment problems in the past also take more risk. The
negative coefficient for ACORD implies that borrowers in a borrowing group
belonging to the ACORD system take less risk. The underlying reason probably is that
the number of members in credit groups belonging to the ACORD system is lower.
Larger groups may lead to more risk taking of the individual members, possibly due
to a better scope for free riding. These results hold for both the OLS and TOBIT
estimates.
In equations 2A and 2B the regressions are repeated by ignoring the
insignificant terms. These regressions confirm the results suggested by equations 1A
and 1B. Finally, we re-estimate the equations by replacing PROBLEM, by
APROBCRED (equations 3A and 3B). APROBCRED measures the amount of money
that was involved when the borrower had problems repaying the debt, as a percentage
of the size of the loan in the previous loan cycle. This indicator serves as an
alternative indicator for PROBLEM. The results of these regressions again confirm
the basic message of equations 1A and 1B.
Since FACTOR2 mainly has to do with three indicators, ACCORD, VISIT and
NUMBER, we also perform OLS and TOBIT regressions in which FACTOR2 is
replaced by one of these individual indicators. The regression results show that each
of these individual terms, with the exception of the OLS estimate for NUMBER,a r e
significant. Being a borrower from a credit group associated with the ACORD system
has a negative effect on risk taking. The same holds for more visits among members
of a credit group. An increase in the number of members of a credit group enhances
risk taking of an individual borrower. The results are not presented for reasons of
space, but can be obtained on request.18
We are now able to come up with an estimate of α i i X r =
* and β β i i f f =
(equations 5 and 6, above). For this we use the estimation results of equation 2B (the
TOBIT estimates) presented in Table 5. As we have explained before, we argue that
the variables that are related to the socio-economic situation (i.e. LINC, LINC2, SEC
and LEADER) determine the risk choice in a frictionless world. The other variables
(PROBLEM and FACTOR2) are primarily related to matching frictions. By using the
estimated coefficient of equation 2B (Table 5) we can now come up with an estimate
of
*
i r , which we name FIRSTBEST and i f β , which we name FRICTION.
6
8. Heterogeneity
The final step in the analysis is to estimate the heterogeneity equation (equation 7).
For this we first need to develop a measure of risk heterogeneity.
The measure for risk heterogeneity:























=  ∈ ,w h e r e i r is the mean risk in i’s group Gi.
7
Table 6 gives descriptive statistics of h. Figure 2 graphs heterogeneity by
means of kernel distributions.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
The graph clearly show that heterogeneity in almost all cases differs from zero. This
seems to imply that we have to reject the hypothesis of homogeneous matching since
with homogeneous matching the risk heterogeneity within groups should be equal to
zero. However, it may be the case that this heterogeneity is caused by matching
frictions, an issue we will examine by estimating equation 7.19
Estimation results
The estimates of the heterogeneity equation are presented in Table 7.
8 Again we use
the OLS as well as the TOBIT estimation technique. The dependent variable in the
regressions is our proxy for heterogeneity (h). It appears that the coefficient for
FIRSTBEST is significantly different from zero at the 99% level, strongly suggesting
that homogeneous matching will not take place, even if the estimates are controlled
for matching frictions.
<Insert Table 7 about here>
9. Conclusions
We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who
accessed loans from two microcredit programs in Eritrea. Using the results from this
survey, this paper aims to provide new insights on the empirical relevance of the
homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea. A better insight
about how groups are formed and whether these groups are homogeneous is
extremely important for our understanding of the working of microcredit
programmes. The result of our analysis can be used as input, or as intermediate result,
for an analysis on repayment performance of joint liability schemes versus individual
liability debt contracts.
An important part of the methodology to test for homogeneous matching
consists of estimating risk behaviour. This analysis suggests that there is a non-linear
relationship between the income of a borrower and risk taking. Below a certain
threshold level of income, an increase in income will lead to less risk taking, whereas
an increase in income will increase risk taking above a certain level of income. We
also find that group leaders take more risk than normal group members, that better
educated borrowers take more risk, and that borrowers that have had payment
problems in the past will take more risk. Moreover, we find some evidence that
borrowers in larger groups will take more risk than borrowers in smaller groups.20
Concerning the homogeneous matching hypothesis, our results strongly
indicate that groups are formed heterogeneously. Most importantly, we do not find
support for the matching frictions hypothesis, in the sense that even if we control for
matching frictions, credit groups in Eritrea do not seem to consist of borrowers of the
similar risk type. The implication of this finding for repayment behavior is not clear at
forehand. However, our result seems to be bad news for those who argue that group
lending may reduce problems of adverse selection. In some theoretical papers it has
been argued that incentive compatible separating equilibria will result if a lender
offers different types of debt contracts, with varying components for joint liability. By
choosing a particular debt contract, the borrower will signal its type and hence the
asymetric information and consequently the adverse selection problem will be solved.
However, this result is based on the homogeneous matching hypothesis.
Of course, some reservations with respect to our main conclusions can be
made. For instance, the classification of variables in a group that primarily deals with
matching frictions, and a group of variables dealing with first-best risk determinants
may be criticised. In addition, our variables FIRSTBEST and FRICTION are
constructed variables, and therefore are measured with error. This may biase the
estimates of the coefficients. Moreover, the measure of risk we use may not be the
most accurate measure for risk taking. There may exist other measures of risk that are
better proxies. It may then be the case that using another measure for risk will lead to
homogeneous matching, instead of the heterogeneous matching we found byusing
our measure for risk. More research on these issues is needed. Nevertheless, given the
data we have, and taking into account all possible drawbacks of the methodology
used, we think that our analysis, at the least, suggests that the commonly held
assumption of homogeneous matching can not be confirmed for the case of Eritrea. If
one accepts that groups are formed heterogeneously, an important issue is then to
examine why this is so. A possible reason brought forward in some recent papers is
the insurance that risky and safe borrowers may provide. The models behind the
homogeneous matching hypothesis assume that borrowers are risk neutral and that
project returns do not covary. This implies that in these models there is no possibility
to gain from economies of risk pooling. However, if borrowers are risk averse and21
project returns are not independent, then a borrower may gain by grouping with
another borrower if the project returns of the two borrowers are negatively correlated.
This may then imply that heterogeneous matching is be the optimal outcome.22
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A p p e n d i x :L i s to fv a r i a b l e s
ACTIV: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knows what the (daily)
economic activities of the other group members are, zero otherwise
ACORD: a dummy variable with a one if the group belongs to the SZSCS (ACORD)
system, 0 otherwise
AGE: the age of a borrower
BORN: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower is born in the village, zero
otherwise
CHANGE: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower has participated before in
another group, zero otherwise
DIST: the average distance (in meters) of the business of the borrower from that of the
other group members
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GENDER: a dummy with a one for a male, and a zero for a woman
ILLIT: a dummy with a one if the borrower is illiterate, zero otherwise
INTEG: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knew about the behavioural
integrity of all current group members before the formation of the group, zero
otherwise
LDIST: the logarithm of the average distance of the business of the borrower from
that of the other group members
KNOW: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knew the members well before
meeting them in the group, zero otherwise
LEADER: a dummy with a one if the borrower is a group leader, zero otherwise
MUSLIM: a dummy with a one if the borrower is a Muslim, zero otherwise.
LINC: the logarithm of total monthly income
NUMBER: the amount of members of the group
OTHER: a dummy with a one if the borrower has other sources of credit, zero
otherwise25
P : loan payment due per month
PRIM: a dummy with a one if the borrower has primary education, zero otherwise
PROBLEM: a dummy with a one if the borrower has had problems in repaying debt
before, zero otherwise.
PURP: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knows for what purpose the
other group members acquired their last loans
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and ri =0for Pi <S
S : the amount the borrower reported having saved one week before the due data
SEC: a dummy with a one if the borrower has secondary education, zero otherwise
SEL: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower approximately knows the weekly
sales of the other group members, zero otherwise
VISIT: a dummy variable with a one if the members visit each other regularly, zero
otherwise.
Source: Unless stated otherwise, all variables are obtained via a survey (personel
interviews) in 2001 among members and groupleaders of credit groups in Eritrea. The
survey is done in four of the six zones of Eritrea and contain credit the two
microfinance institutions in Eritrea (the Saving and Credit Programme, SCP,a n dt h e
Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme, SZCS .26
Table 1: Information on Credit and Risk
Credit Size P S r
Mean 3961 422 356 0.17
Median 3500 380 300 0.09
Maximum 8500 2320 2080 1.00
Minimum 750 71.25 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 1802 315 272 0.213
Skewness 0.468 2.714 2.440 1.967
Kurtosis 2.406 13.008 12.257 7.761
Jarque-Bera 17.97 1895.87 1601.76 557.80
Observations 351 351 351 351
Note: for a list of variable see the Appendix. All values (except for r)a r ei nN a k f a s .
The Jarque-Bera statistic is a test for normality. The statistic has a χ
2 distribution with
2 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors.27
Table 2: Variables explaining risk: Zero-One dummies
No. of observations





BORN 179 (51) 172 351
KNOW 287 (82) 64 351
INTEG 290 (83) 61 351
ACTIV 307 (87) 44 351
PURP 333 (95) 18 351
SEL 19 (5) 332 351
VISIT 265 (75) 86 351
PROBLEM 60 (17) 291 351
OTHER 18 (5) 333 351
ACORD 167 (48) 184 351
CHANGE 35 (10) 316 351
ILLIT 111 (32) 240 351
PRIM 128 (36) 223 351
SEC 19 (5) 332 351
LEADER 102 (29) 241 351
MUSLIM 70 (20) 281 351
GENDER 155 (44) 196 351
Note: See Table 1.28
Table 3: Other variables explaining risk
INC AGE DIST NUMBER
Mean 1017 46 499 4
Median 1000 45 200 4
Maximum 13000 77 5000 8
Minimum 300 18 5 3
Std. Dev. 752 11.67 863 1.32
Skewness 11.661 0.002 3.52 0.66
Kurtosis 185.24 2.65 17.01 2.80
Jarque-Bera 493661 1.76 3595 23.87
Observations 351 351 351 325
Note: see Table 129
Table 4: Factorloadings for factor analysis on matching frictions variables
FACTOR1 FACTOR2 FACTOR3
ACORD -0.146 0.916 0.129
BORN 0.275 -0.227 -0.021
CHANGE 0.018 0.236 -0.019
KNOW 0.923 0.038 0.208
INTEG 0.935 0.050 0.202
LDIST -0.176 -0.025
ACTIV 0.226 -0.093 0.376
PURP 0.058 0.120 0.733
SEL 0.102 0.185 0.048
VISIT 0.152 0.323 0.306
NUMBER 0.077 -0.632 0.019
Chi square Statistic: 24. 7; 25 Df; p-value: 0.479; CUMVAR=0.394
Note: Factor loadings smaller than 0.01 are not reported. Df denotes the degrees of
freedom. CUMVAR gives the cumulative variance explained by the factors taken into
account. The factor analysis is done on 323 observations (the common sample of all
indicators. Observations refer to groups of both microfinance institutions ). The Chi
square Statistic is a test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient versus the
alternative that more are required. Df: degrees of freedom. P-value is the probability
of being wrong when the null hypothesis is rejected (the plausibility of the null
hypothesis. So, the smaller is the P-value, the less plausible is the null hypothesis).
See the Appendix for a list of variables.30
Table 5: Estimating risk
1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B






















































































































2 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.49 0.53
Note: the amount of observations is 323 for all regressions. t-values (z-values for
Tobit) based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors (for the OLS
regressions) and QML (Huber/ White) standard errors between parantheses. The
Tobit estimates are done with left (0) and right (1) censoring; there are 94 left












Note: see the Appendix for a list of variables33



















Note: the amount of observations is 323 for all regressions. t-values (z-values) for
OLS (for TOBIT) between paranthesis (based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors and Covariances and Huber/White robust standard
errors&ccovariances, respectively). In equation 1 there is 1 right and 1 left censored
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Figure 1: risk (r)
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Figure 2: heterogeneity (h)
Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h = 0.1560)36
Endnotes
1 See Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) for microfinance practices beyond group
lending.
2 Detailed information on the questionnaire can be obtained on request.
3 Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) consider the three last dates before the repayment date since
repayments in their case take place once per week. In our case loan payments are once per
month.
4 Note that Sadoulet and Carpenter use the sum of expected sales in the last three days before
the due date as the scaling factor, instead of Pi. Our questionnaire also contains a question on
the expected sales in the last days (week in our case) before the due date. However, since the
answers to this question were totally unreliable we decided to scale by Pi .
5 Note that in Armendariz de Agion (1999) groups are exogenously given. In practice, there is
a tradeoff between group size (monitoring effort) and benefits of size (diversifation, easier to
cover one defaulting partner). Group size is thus endogenous. We ignore this problem in our
analysis.
6 We assume that the conditional mean (E[yi]) of the TOBIT regression equation
i i i x y ε β + = . equals Κ i xi . If all independent variables are taken into account, this forecasts
the so-called expected latent variable.
7 We also used a measure for heterogeneity that is not adjusted for having a risk above or
below the mean risk. This gave qualitatively the same results.
8 It should be noted that the variables FIRSTBEST and FRICTIONS are measured with errors.
OLS (and Tobit) estimates of the heterogeneity equation may therefore be biased. A possible
solution, used by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) is to estimate the heterogeneity equation with
instrumental variables. However, due to a lack of candidates for instruments in our sample, we
d e c i d e dt or e l yo nt h eO L Se s t i m a t e s .